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A B S T R A C T
In a countermeasures experiment, we examined to what extent liars who learn about the Model Statement tool and 
about the proportion of complications (complications/complications + common knowledge details + self-handicapping 
strategies) can successfully adjust their responses so that they sound like truth tellers. Truth tellers discussed a trip they 
had made; liars fabricated a story. Participants were of Lebanese, Mexican, and South-Korean origin. Prior to the interview 
they did or did not receive information about (i) the working of the Model statement and (ii) three types of verbal detail: 
complications, common knowledge details and self-handicapping strategies. We found no evidence that liars sounded 
like truth tellers after being informed about the Model Statement and/or types of detail we examined. Actually, veracity 
differences were similar across experimental conditions, with truth tellers reporting more detail and more complications 
and obtaining a higher proportion of complications score than liars.
La eficacia del uso de contramedidas en una entrevista de declaración modelo
R E S U M E N
En un experimento de contramedidas examinamos hasta qué punto los mentirosos que reciben información sobre la Decla-
ración modelo y la proporción de complicaciones que presenta (complicaciones / complicaciones + detalles de conocimiento 
general + estrategias de autoobstaculización) pueden ajustar sus respuestas con éxito para que parezca que dicen la verdad. 
Los que dicen la verdad declararon sobre un viaje que habían hecho; los mentirosos inventaron una historia. Los participan-
tes eran de origen libanés, mexicano y surcoreano. Antes de la entrevista habían recibido o no información sobre (i) el funcio-
namiento de la Declaración modelo y (ii) tres tipos de detalles verbales: complicaciones, detalles de conocimiento general y 
estrategias de autoobstaculización. No encontramos evidencia de que los mentirosos se parecieran a los que dicen la verdad 
después de ser informados sobre la Declaración modelo y los tipos de detalle que examinamos. En realidad, las diferencias 
de veracidad fueron semejantes en todas las condiciones experimentales: los que decían la verdad informaron con mayor 
detalle y de más complicaciones y obtuvieron una mayor puntuación en la proporción de complicaciones que los mentirosos.
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The Efficacy of Using Countermeasures in a Model Statement 
Interview
Deception research has shown that cues to deceit are typically 
faint and unreliable (DePaulo et al., 2003). In response to this, 
researchers have started to examine whether cues to deceit could 
be enhanced or elicited through specific interview protocols (Vrij 
& Granhag, 2012). They also have started to examine verbal cues to 
deception not previously examined before (Nahari, 2018; Vrij, Leal, 
Jupe, & Harvey, 2018). This resulted in interview protocols such as 
the Model Statement tool (Leal, Vrij, Warmelink, Vernham, & Fisher, 
2015; Vrij, Leal, & Fisher, 2018) and in new verbal cues, such as the 
proportion of complications (Vrij, Leal, Jupe et al., 2018).
In the current experiment, we addressed the extent to which 
the Model Statement tool and the proportion of complications are 
vulnerable to countermeasures. That is, to what extent can a liar who 
learns about the Model Statement tool and about the proportion 
of complications successfully adjust her/his responses so that s/he 
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sounds like a truth teller? Research examining the Model Statement 
tool and the proportion of complications has been published and is 
accessible to everyone through the internet. In addition, practitioners 
have started to use the Model Statement tool and examine the 
proportion of complications in investigative interviews (Vrij, Leal, & 
Fisher, 2018).
The Model Statement tool is part of Cognitive Credibility Assessment 
(Vrij, Fisher, & Blank, 2017). A Model Statement is an example of a 
detailed account unrelated to the topic of the interview (Leal et al., 
2015). A Model Statement raises the expectations amongst both truth 
tellers and liars about how much information they should provide 
(Ewens et al., 2016). As a result, both truth tellers and liars provide 
more details after listening to a Model Statement and do this to a 
similar extent (Vrij, Leal, & Fisher, 2018). However, the type of detail 
provided by truth tellers and liars seems to differ. After being exposed 
to a Model Statement, truth tellers reported more complications (an 
occurrence that makes a situation more difficult) than liars (Vrij, Leal 
et al., 2017; Vrij, Leal, Jupe, & Harvey, 2018).
Many deception studies focus on the total amount of information 
provided by the interviewee. This variable often discriminates truth 
tellers from liars, with truth tellers typically reporting more details 
than liars (Amado, Arce, Fariña, & Vilarino, 2016). However, total 
amount of information is a generic measure that does not take well 
enough into account the different verbal strategies truth tellers 
and liars employ. Vrij and colleagues (Vrij, Leal et al., 2017; Vrij, 
Leal, Fisher, Mann et al., 2018; Vrij, Leal, Jupe et al., 2018; Vrij, Leal, 
Mann et al., 2018; Vrij et al., 2019) started to break down this generic 
measure (total amount of information) into components that they 
believed to be more sensitive to the different verbal strategies used 
by truth tellers and liars: complications (e.g., “The air conditioning 
was not working properly in the hotel”), common knowledge details 
(strongly invoked stereotypical knowledge about events, e.g., “We 
visited the Louvre museum where we saw the Mona Lisa”), and self-
handicapping strategies (justifications as to why someone is not able 
to provide information, e.g., “Nothing unexpected happened; I am a 
very organised person”). Across experiments, truth tellers reported 
more complications than liars, whereas liars reported more common 
knowledge details and self-handicapping strategies than truth tellers. 
The proportion of complications, complications / (complications + 
common knowledge details + self-handicapping strategies), was also 
higher for truth tellers than liars and was a more diagnostic tool to 
distinguish truth tellers from liars than ‘total amount of information’ 
(Vrij, Leal et al., 2017; Vrij, Leal, Fisher, Mann et al., 2018; Vrij, Leal, 
Jupe et al., 2018; Vrij, Leal, Mann et al., 2018; Vrij et al., 2019).
Several studies in the verbal lie detection domain have examined 
the extent to which verbal lie detection techniques are vulnerable to 
countermeasures. This seems to depend on the technique examined. 
First, the Verifiability Approach (Nahari, 2018; Nahari & Vrij, 2019; 
Vrij & Nahari, 2019). The core of this approach is that truth tellers 
are more likely than liars to report details that someone can check 
(e.g., “When I entered the cinema, I walked into my friend Fred’). The 
Verifiability Approach was resistant to countermeasures (Nahari, Vrij, 
& Fisher, 2014). In fact, informing truth tellers and liars about the 
working of the Verifiability Approach (i.e., informing interviewees 
that the investigator would like to hear details s/he can check) 
actually increased the difference between truth tellers and liars in 
reporting verifiable details, because this information enticed truth 
tellers to report more additional verifiable details than liars (Vrij & 
Nahari, 2019).
Second, the Strategic Use of Evidence (SUE) technique. The core of 
the SUE technique is that during interviews truth tellers are generally 
forthcoming, whereas liars are inclined to be avoidant or to use 
denials (e.g., denying having been at a certain place at a specific time 
when asked directly; Granhag & Hartwig, 2008). When investigators 
ask questions related to the evidence without making the interviewee 
aware that they possess this evidence, these different strategies 
used by truth tellers and liars result in truth tellers’ accounts being 
more forthcoming and therefore more consistent with the available 
evidence than liars’ accounts (Hartwig, Granhag, & Luke, 2014). The 
SUE technique was to some extent resistant to countermeasures (Luke, 
Hartwig, Shamash, & Granhag, 2016). Liars who were informed about 
the SUE technique were more verbally forthcoming (i.e., admitting to 
more critical details about their activities) than uninformed liars, but 
they were still less forthcoming than truth tellers.
Third, Criteria-Based Content Analysis (CBCA) (Amado, Arce, & 
Fariña, 2015; Köhnken & Steller, 1988; Volbert & Steller, 2014). CBCA 
comprises 19 criteria which are thought to be more often present in 
truthful than in deceptive accounts for cognitive and motivational 
reasons (Köhnken, 1996, 2004). Several criteria are more likely to 
occur in truthful statements than in fabricated statements because it is 
thought to be cognitively too difficult for liars to fabricate them. Others 
are more likely to occur for motivational reasons. Liars will be keener 
than truth tellers to try to construct a report that they believe will 
make a credible impression on others, and will leave out information 
that, in their view, will damage their image of being a sincere person. 
CBCA was vulnerable to the use of countermeasures. Liars who were 
informed about several CBCA criteria did provide verbal responses 
that sounded similar to those of truth tellers (Vrij, Kneller, & Mann, 
2000). The difference between VA and SUE, on the one hand, and 
CBCA, on the other hand, is that VA and SUE focus on case evidence 
whereas CBCA does not. That is, VA examines which information 
provided by an interviewee can be verified and SUE compares the 
provided information with the available evidence. In contrast, CBCA 
examines the quality of a statement and assumes that some details are 
unlikely to be reported by liars. It is more difficult for liars to fabricate 
a statement that is congruent with the available evidence than it is 
to fabricate a statement that includes types of detail assumed to be 
reported by truth tellers.
Similar to CBCA criteria, complications, common knowledge details, 
and self-handicapping strategies are types of detail that reflect the 
quality of the answers provided. Since CBCA details are vulnerable to 
countermeasures, it could be that complications, common knowledge 
details, and self-handicapping strategies are also vulnerable to 
countermeasures, and perhaps even more so when interviewees 
are informed about the Model Statement tool as that relates to the 
amount of information interviewees are expected to provide. We thus 
predict that if liars will be able to use countermeasures effectively 
in a Model Statement interview (i.e., produce verbal responses that 
sound similar to truth tellers’ responses), this is most likely to happen 
when they are informed about (i) the types of detail examined and 
(ii) the amount of information they are supposed to give. This study, 
including this hypothesis, is pre-registered at https://osf.io/s68vx/.1
Deception research has typically been conducted in the United 
States and Western Europe (Vrij, 2008). However, practitioners 
frequently ask us whether the research findings apply in different 
cultures. To answer this question, research outside the US and 
Western Europe is required (Leal et al., 2018). In the present 
experiment, we recruited participants in Lebanon, Mexico, and 
South-Korea.
Method
Design
In the present article, we analysed the data in two different ways. 
First, we carried out analyses of variance using a 2 (veracity) x 2 
(Model Statement pre-informed) x 2 (types of detail pre-informed) 
between-subjects design focusing on the unique details provided 
in the entire interview (i.e., details provided in the initial recall plus 
new details provided in the second recall). The dependent variables 
were the total number of details, complications, common knowledge 
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details, and self-handicapping details provided as well as the 
proportion of complications.
Recently, Vrij and colleagues proposed to use the Model Statement 
tool as a within-subjects tool, that is, to make comparisons within a 
single interviewee by comparing different parts of his/her statement 
(Vrij, Leal, & Fisher, 2018; Vrij, Leal, Jupe et al., 2018). Within-subjects 
tools are thought to be more applicable than between-subjects tool 
because they control for individual differences, such as differences in 
being talkative or eloquent (Vrij, 2016). Vrij and colleagues suggested 
to start the interview by eliciting an initial free recall, then to play 
a Model Statement followed by a second free recall. They further 
recommended to focus on the second free recall and examine the 
amount of new details and types of new detail elicited in the second 
free recall (details not provided in the initial recall). Reflecting this 
suggested method we also carried out a 2 (veracity) x 2 (Model 
Statement pre-informed) x 2 (types of detail pre-informed) analysis 
of variance, focusing on the new details provided in the second recall 
only.
A consistent finding in the deception literature is that liars 
prepare themselves more for interviews than truth tellers (Colwell, 
Hiscock-Anisman, Memon, Woods, & Michlik, 2006; Hartwig, 
Granhag, & Strömwall, 2007; Vrij, Mann, Leal, & Granhag, 2010). This 
could also apply to reading about interview protocols and types of 
detail that practitioners examine. In an additional set of analyses, 
we took this difference between truth tellers and liars into account 
and compared the responses of uninformed truth tellers with those 
of informed liars. To do this, an analysis of variance was conducted 
with veracity as the only factor and this veracity factor had four 
levels: (i) uninformed truth tellers, (ii) liars informed about the 
Model Statement, (iii) liars informed about the types of detail, and 
(iv) liars informed about the Model Statement and the types of 
detail.
Participants
A total of 201 University students (80 males and 111 females, 10 
unknown) took part in the study. Their age ranged from 17 to 43 years 
with an average age of M = 21.57 years (SD = 2.99). The experiment 
took place in three different universities in Lebanon, Mexico, and 
South Korea and the participants were of Lebanese (n = 56), Mexican 
(n = 65), and Korean (n = 80) origin.
A post hoc power analysis was conducted via GPower software. 
The analysis showed that for a small to medium effect size of f2 = 
0.14 (based on the effect sizes in Table 1; Cohen’s d was converted 
to f) and six dependent variables (details, complications low, 
complications medium/high, common knowledge details, self-
handicapping strategies, and proportion of complications), the 
study had good power (1.00).
Procedure
Recruitment, pre-condition selection form, preparation, and 
pre-interview questionnaire. We used the same procedure as Vrij, 
Leal et al. (2017), Vrij, Leal, Fisher, Mann et al. (2018), Vrij, Leal, Mann 
et al. (2018), and Vrij et al. (2019). Some parts of the description of 
the Procedure were taken from Vrij et al. (2019) word by word. All 
materials in the study (recruitment material, selection form, (de)
briefing forms, questionnaires, countermeasures material, the 
audiotaped model statement) were provided in the participants’ 
native language. Translations were carried out by native speakers 
familiar with the relevant deception literature. Participants were 
recruited via an advert on the university intranets and advertisement 
leaflets distributed in university buildings. The advert explained that 
the experiment would require participants to tell the truth or lie 
about a trip away that they may (or may not) have taken within the 
last year. We decided upon “within the last year” so that truth tellers 
would still remember many details about their trip and liars could 
not easily feign memory loss when answering the questions. After 
reading a participant’s information sheet and signing an informed 
consent form, participants completed a selection form that contained 
six cities that the researchers thought the participants may have 
visited during the past year. (Different cities were used for the three 
different countries.) The six cities were included on the selection 
form so that we would obtain some kind of standardization of the 
cities discussed in the study. The participants were also asked to 
write down the names of two other cities they had visited during the 
past year. We did so because if truth tellers had not been to any of the 
six cities mentioned on the selection form in the past twelve months, 
they could discuss one of these two additional cities in the interview.
For each city the participants indicated (a) whether they had 
been there during the last twelve months, (b) when they had been 
there during the last twelve months, (c) for how long they stayed 
there, and (d) whether they have lived there. For truth tellers, the 
experimenter selected one of the six cities where the participant had 
stayed during the last twelve months for at least two nights but had 
never lived there. If truth teller had stayed in only one of those six 
cities, that particularly city was chosen. If a truth teller had stayed 
in more than one of these six cities the experimenter chose a city, 
ideally one that had not been discussed by (too) many truth tellers 
before so that we would obtain a variety of cities being discussed. If 
a truth teller had not been to any of the six cities, the experimenter 
selected one of the additional cities that the truth teller had listed 
on the selection form. Truth tellers were informed that they would 
be interviewed about this selected city (city X) and asked to answer 
the questions truthfully. For liars, the experimenter selected either 
one of the six cities on the selection form where the liar had never 
been in his/her life before, or selected a city not on the list but which 
was discussed by a truth teller during an interview (after checking 
that the liar had never been to this city before). Therefore, the truth 
tellers’ and liars’ cities were matched. Liars were informed that they 
would be interviewed about city X and that they had to pretend to 
have stayed there for at least two nights during a trip made during 
the last twelve months. Across all 97 truth tellers, 31 cities were 
used. Each truth teller reported a trip to a single city (rather than 
to multiple cities). The cities liars discussed were taken from this 
sample of 31 cities.
Participants were then given a computer with internet access 
and told they had twenty minutes to prepare themselves for their 
interview, or to inform the experimenter if they were ready before 
that time. The participants were told that they were allowed to 
make notes while doing their research. They were also told that it 
was important to be convincing because, if they did not appear 
convincing, they would be asked to write a statement about what 
they told the interviewer in the interview.
After preparing for their interview, participants were allocated to 
the Model Statement Information and Types of Detail Pre-Informed 
conditions. Those allocated to the Model Statement Pre-Informed 
Absent condition were not informed about the Model Statement, 
whereas those allocated to the Model Statement Pre-Informed 
Present condition were given an information sheet about the Model 
Statement. The information was taken from the article in which 
the Model Statement was introduced (Leal et al., 2015) and from an 
article in which the technique was summarised (Vrij, Fisher et al., 
2017). In sum, the provided information informed readers what the 
Model Statement is (an audiotaped account of a detailed report) and 
its aim (to encourage interviewees to say more). It did not contain 
information about complications, common knowledge details, and 
self-handicapping strategies or about using the Model Statement as a 
within-subjects lie detection tool (Leal et al., 2015 and Vrij, Fisher et 
al., 2017 do not discuss these two issues either). The full information 
sheet is provided in the Appendix. 
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Participants allocated to the Types of Detail Pre-Informed Absent 
condition were not given information to read about complications, 
common knowledge details, and self-handicapping strategies, 
whereas participants allocated to the Types of Detail Pre-Informed 
Present condition were. They read parts of Vrij, Leal, Jupe et al. (2018), 
an article that focused entirely on these three variables. In sum, the 
provided information and gave definitions and examples of these 
three variables and how they are related to deception. The Model 
Statement tool was not mentioned in the information sheet. In their 
article, Vrij, Leal, Jupe et al. (2018) discuss the Model Statement as 
a within-subjects lie detection tool but this information was not 
given to participants. The full information sheet is provided in the 
Appendix.
In a pre-interview questionnaire, written in a participant’s native 
language, participants rated their thoroughness of preparation 
via three items: (1) shallow to (7) thorough; (1) insufficient to (7) 
sufficient; and (1) poor to (7) good. The answers to the three questions 
were averaged (Cronbach’s alpha = .90) and the variable is called 
‘preparation thoroughness’. Participants were also asked whether 
they thought they were given enough time to prepare themselves 
with the following question: “Do you think the amount of time you 
were given to prepare was (1) insufficient to (7) sufficient?”. Finally, 
participants were asked how motivated they were to perform well 
during the interview: (1) not at all motivated to (5) very motivated. 
Experimental conditions. Participants were allocated randomly 
to one of the eight experimental cells. A total of 97 participants were 
allocated to the truth condition and 104 to the lie condition; 100 to 
the Model Statement Pre-Informed Absent condition and 101 to the 
Model Statement Ore-Informed Present condition; 100 to the Types 
of Detail Pre-Informed Absent condition; and 101 to the Types of 
Detail Pre-Informed Present condition. Individual cell sizes varied 
from 24 to 25.
In total ten interviewers were used. The interviewers were native 
to Lebanon, Mexico, and South-Korea and the interviews took place 
in their native countries in the native languages. Nationality is 
therefore confounded with the specific interviewer. To control for the 
possible effects of this confound, we included “site” as a covariate in 
the hypotheses-testing analyses.
The interview. Prior to the interview, the experimenter told 
the interviewer about which city to interview the participant. To 
make the interviewee feel comfortable and to avoid floor effects 
in establishing rapport interviewees were offered a glass of water 
from the interviewer, as offering something helps rapport building 
(reciprocation principle; Cialdini, 2007).
The interviewer started by saying “I will interview you about 
your trip to ________. Depending on your answers, we may decide to 
interview you a second time.” This was followed by the following two 
questions: “Please tell me in as much detail as possible everything you 
did to plan this trip, e.g., organising transportation, accommodation, 
what to visit and so on” and “Please tell me in as much detail as 
possible everything you did when you were at _________ from the 
moment you arrived to the moment you left.” The two questions 
were always asked in this order.
After finishing the second answer the interviewer said: “Thank 
you, I would like to ask you the questions once more, but this time, 
before doing so, I am going to play you a model statement to give 
you an example of how much detail I would like you to include in 
your responses.” The interviewer then played the audiotaped Model 
Statement used by Leal et al. (2015). It was a 1.30 minute long, detailed 
account of someone attending a Formula 2 motor racing event. The 
account was a spontaneous, unscripted, recall of an event truly 
experienced by the person. This Model Statement was followed by 
the same two questions as asked before the Model Statement, again 
always in the same order (the question about planning of the trip first).
The interviews were audio recorded. The Arabic, Spanish, and 
Korean text was transcribed and then translated into English.
Post-interview questionnaire. After the interview, participants 
completed a post-interview questionnaire, which was again written 
in a participant’s native language. Participants were asked to indicate 
the extent to which they told the truth during the interview on an 
11-point Likert scale ranging from 0% to 100%. Rapport was measured 
via the nine-item Interaction Questionnaire (Vallano & Schreiber 
Compo, 2011). Participants rated the interviewer on 7-point scales 
ranging from 1 = not at all to 7 = extremely on nine characteristics 
such as smooth, bored, engrossed, and involved (Cronbach’s alpha = 
.65). 
Participants were subsequently asked the following four questions 
about the aim of the Model Statement: (i) the model statement made 
me realise that my initial answers were not detailed enough; (ii) the 
model statement made me realise that my initial answers were too 
detailed; (iii) I think the aim of the model statement is to encourage 
me to say more; and (iv) I think the aim of the model statement is to 
encourage me to say less. Answers were given on 7-point Likert scales 
ranging from 1 = not to all to 7 = very much so. 
Participants were also asked how they thought complications, 
common knowledge details, and self-handicapping strategies were 
associated with deception by answering multiple-choice questions. 
For complications, the participants were asked: “Truth tellers typically 
report more complications than liars.” The possible answers were: (i) 
true, (ii) false, and (iii) I don’t know. Similar questions were asked 
for common knowledge details and self-handicapping strategies. No 
definitions of complications, common knowledge details, and self-
handicapping strategies were given.
Participants in the Model Statement Information present condi-
tion were asked the extent to which they had read the information 
about the Model Statement by answering the following question: 
“How thoroughly did you read the information about the model 
statement?. Participants in the Types of Detail Information pre-
sent condition were asked: “How thoroughly did you read the in-
formation about complications, common knowledge details, and 
self-handicapping strategies?”. Answers were given on 7-point Li-
kert scales ranging from 1 = not at all to 7 = thoroughly. Participants 
in the Model Statement Information present condition were also 
asked the extent to which they had understood the information 
about the Model Statement by answering the following question: 
“Do you think you fully understood the information you read about 
the model statement?”. Participants in the Types of Detail Infor-
mation present condition were asked: “Do you think you fully un-
derstood the information you read about complications, common 
knowledge details and self-handicapping strategies?”. Answers 
were given on 7-point Likert scales ranging from 1 = not at all to 
7 = definitely.
Coding
Detail. The coders, blind to the Veracity and Countermeasures 
conditions, were taught the coding scheme by the first author who 
had more than twenty years of experience in coding detail. Coding 
occurred on the English transcripts. A coder first read the transcripts 
and coded each detail in the interview. A detail is defined as a non-
redundant unit of information about the trip the interviewee allegedly 
had made. For example, the following answer has six details: ‘I didn’t 
bring my slippers, so my feet were so hot that I walked faster’. Each 
detail in the interview was coded only once; thus repetitions were 
not coded. A second coder coded a random sample of 40 transcripts. 
Inter-rater reliability between the two coders, using the two-way 
random effects model measuring consistency, was good (single 
measures ICC = .72).
One coder coded the following measures in all transcripts: 
complications, common knowledge details, and self-handicapping 
strategies. Repetitions were not coded. A complication is an occurrence 
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that affects the story-teller and makes a situation more difficult. It 
differs from the CBCA criterion 7 ‘unexpected complications’ because 
in our definition something does not have to be unexpected to be 
a complication. Thus, if someone says that s/he flew from London 
to Ottawa via Toronto, the person describes a complication in our 
definition but not in the CBCA’s definition.
Although complications can range in the degree of complexity, 
this distinction has never been made in research to date. We decided 
to make a distinction between complications low in complexity 
versus other complications (medium/high) to explore whether liars 
are inclined to report complications low in complexity. Example of 
complications-low are: (a) “There weren’t many buses running so 
we took a taxi”; (b) “At breakfast there weren’t enough seats, which 
really annoyed me”; and (c) “My friend was worried because the 
plane was shaking quite hard”. Examples of complications-medium/
high are (d) “The bus went up a very steep slope until it couldn’t go 
further; we got off from the bus and walked over the hill”; (e) “On 
the bus an old man said ‘don’t hold hands’ and hit our hands with 
an umbrella, ‘don’t you have any public manners?’, so, we got off the 
bus and took the next one”; and (f) “I said to my mum ‘if you forced 
me to go to Gyeongju, I’d go back to Seoul’; then mum got really 
angry and screamed ‘are you joking on me?’, I cried and said that I 
was really stressed out; I told her that I came to Pohang to release 
stress not to get more stress”. Common knowledge details refer to 
strongly invoked stereotypical knowledge about events (Vrij, Leal, 
Jupe et al., 2018). Examples of common knowledge details are: (g) 
“So we dropped by shops for clothes, cosmetics and such things”; 
(h) “I went to Santa Monica Beach; I looked around the beach and it 
was better than I had expected;” and (i) “I went to Universal Studio; 
I think I stayed there all day long”. Self-handicapping strategies refer 
to justifications as to why someone is not able to provide information 
(Vrij, Leal, Jupe et al., 2018). Examples of self-handicapping strategies 
are: (j) “I am not a type of a person who plans a lot”; (k) “We skipped 
some plans and came back to the guest house early”; and (l) “The 
trip was almost one year ago, I really do not remember many details”.
A second coder coded a random sample of 40 transcripts. Inter-
rater reliability between the two coders, using the two-way random 
effects model measuring consistency, was good for all measures: 
complications low (single measures, intraclass correlation 
coefficient, ICC = .88), complications medium/high (single measures 
ICC = .72), common knowledge details (single measures ICC = .81), 
and self-handicapping strategies (single measures ICC = .70).
Results
Preparation Thoroughness, Preparation Time and Motivation
Three 2 (Veracity) x 2 (Model Statement Pre-Informed) x 2 (Types 
of Detail Pre-Informed) ANOVAs were carried out with preparation 
thoroughness, preparation time, and motivation as dependent 
variables. For preparation thoroughness, a significant main effect for 
Veracity emerged, F(1, 193) = 24.00, p < .001, d = 0.69 (0.40, 0.97). 
Truth tellers (M = 5.29, SD = 1.21, 95% CI [5.03, 5.54]) rated their 
preparation as more thorough than liars (M = 4.41, SD = 1.33, 95% CI 
[4.17, 4.66]). All other effects were not significant, all Fs < 3.80, all ps 
> .055. For preparation time, also as significant main Veracity effect 
emerged: F(1, 193) = 38.22, p < .001, d = 0.87 (0.56, 1.14). Truth tellers 
(M = 6.24, SD = 1.14, 95% CI [5.96, 6.52]) believed more than liars (M 
= 5.04, SD = 1.59, 95% CI [4.77, 5.31]) that they were given sufficient 
time to prepare themselves for the interview. All other effects were 
not significant, all F’s < 3.28, all ps > .071. For motivation, a significant 
main effect for Model Statement Pre-Informed emerged, F(1, 193) = 
7.22, p = .008, d = 0.39 (0.10, 0.66). Participants were more motivated 
in the Pre-Informed Present (M = 4.19, SD = 0.77, 95% CI [4.02, 4.35]) 
than in the Pre-Informed Absent (M = 3.86, SD = 0.92, 95% CI [3.70, 
4.03]) condition. All other effects were not significant, all Fs < 2.64, 
all ps > .105. Since preparation thoroughness, preparation time, and 
motivation may affect participants’ verbal output, we introduced 
these variables as covariates in the analyses where we examined 
verbal output.
Note that preparation thoroughness and preparation time were 
measured on 7-point Likert scales but motivation on a 5-point Li-
kert scale. The grand mean scores for preparation thoroughness (M 
= 4.83, SD = 1.34) and preparation time (M = 5.62, SD = 1.51) in-
dicated that participants thought that their preparation time was 
moderate but their preparation time sufficient. The grand mean for 
motivation (M = 4.02, SD = 0.86) shows that participants were very 
motivated.
Rapport and Percentage of Truth Telling
Two ANOVAs utilizing a 2 (Veracity) x 2 (Model Statement 
Pre-Informed) x 2 (Types of Detail Pre-Informed) between-subjects 
design were carried out with (1) rapport, and (2) percentage of tru-
th telling as dependent variables. The analysis with Rapport did not 
result in a significant effect, all Fs < 3.80, all ps > .053. For percen-
tage of truth telling, a main effect for Veracity occurred, F(1, 193) 
= 547.07, p < .001, d = 3.32 (1.84, 3.69). Truth tellers (M = 93.81, SD 
= 11.12, 95% CI [89.40, 98.20]) reported to have been more truthful 
than liars (M = 21.18, SD = 28.90, 95% CI [16.92, 25.43]). All other 
effects were not significant, all Fs < 2.93, all ps > .088. 
Reading and Understanding the Provided Material 
Participants in the Model Statement Pre-Informed Present 
condition indicated that they had read (M = 5.38, SD = 1.51) and 
understood (M = 5.16, SD = 1.53) the information about the Model 
Statement. Four ANOVAs utilizing a one-factorial (Model Statement 
Pre-Informed) between-subjects design were carried with the 
participants’ impressions of the aim of the Model Statement as 
dependent variables. None of the effects were significant, both Fs < 
2.77, all ps > .097. The participants correctly indicated that the aim of 
the Model Statement was to encourage them to say more (M = 6.01, 
SD = 1.50) rather than less (M = 1.61, SD = 1.12). They also reported 
that the Model Statement made them realise that their initial 
answers were not detailed enough (M = 5.26, SD = 1.98) rather than 
too detailed (M = 2.83, SD = 1.89).
Participants in the Types of Detail Pre-Informed Present condi-
tion indicated that they had moderately read (M = 4.58, SD = 1.92) 
and understood (M = 4.09, SD = 1.80) the information about the de-
pendent variables. Chi-square analyses revealed that reading about 
the dependent variables was positively associated with knowing the 
relationship between deception and complications, c2(1, n = 200) = 
7.65, p = .006. More participants (66.3%) who had read information 
about dependent variables were correct in reporting the relationship 
between complications and deception than those who had not read 
such information (47.0%). The associations for common knowledge 
details c2(1, n = 200) = 1.25, p = .264 and self-handicapping strategies 
c2(1, n = 200) = 3.23, p = .073, were not significant.
Time since the Trip Was Made
Truth tellers were asked on the pre-condition selection form 
to indicate when they made the trip they discussed. On average 
this trip was made M = 5. 60 months prior to the interview (SD = 
3.16). This variable was positively correlated with self-handicap-
ping strategies, r(97) = .30, p = .003, but not with any of the other 
main dependent variables in the study (detail, complications low, 
complications medium/high, common knowledge details, or ratio 
of complications), all rs < .17, all ps > .115).
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Hypothesis Testing
Total interview. A MANCOVA utilizing a 2 (Veracity) x 2 (Model 
Statement Pre-Informed) x 2 (Types of Detail Pre-Informed) between-
subjects design was carried out with total details, complications 
low, complications medium/high, common knowledge details, self-
handicapping strategies as the dependent variables (unique details, 
complications etc. reported during the entire interview). Preparation 
thoroughness, preparation time, motivation, and site were covariates.
At a multivariate level, the analysis revealed a main effect for 
Veracity, F(5, 185) = 3.44, p = .005, ηp
2 = .09. The univariate main 
effects for Veracity are presented in Table 1. Truth tellers provided 
more details and more complications (both low and medium/high) 
than liars. The effect sizes (d) ranged from small to medium. All other 
effects were not significant, all Fs < 1.14, all ps > .340.
An ANCOVA utilizing a 2 (Veracity) x 2 (Model Statement Pre-
Informed) x 2 (Types of Detail Pre-Informed) between-subjects 
design was carried out with proportion of complications as the 
dependent variable. Since the patterns of findings for complications 
low and complications medium/high were similar (both more 
reported by truth tellers than by liars) we calculated the proportion 
score based on the total amount of complications (low plus medium/
high). Preparation thoroughness, preparation time, motivation, and 
site were covariates. The analysis revealed a main effect for Veracity, 
F(1, 189) = 4.37, p = .038, d = 0.26 (-0.02, 0.54) with truth tellers (M = 
0.60, SD = 0.36, 95% CI [0.54, 0.68]) obtaining a higher proportion of 
complication score than liars (M = 0.51, SD = 0.33, 95% CI [0.44, 0.57]). 
However, the effect size (d) was small.
The two other main effects and all interaction effects were not 
significant, all Fs < 1.55, all ps > .214. The absence of any significant 
interaction effects involving the Veracity factor means that the 
Hypothesis was rejected.
New information after the model statement. A second MANCOVA 
utilizing a 2 (Veracity) x 2 (Model Statement Pre-Informed) x 2 (Types 
of Detail Pre-Informed) between-subjects design was carried out with 
new details, new complications low, new complications medium/
high, new common knowledge details, and new self-handicapping 
strategies as the dependent variables (details, complications etc. 
reported after the Model Statement that were not reported before 
the Model Statement). Preparation thoroughness, preparation time, 
motivation, and site were covariates. At a multivariate level, the 
analysis revealed main effects for Veracity, F(5, 185) = 4.78, p < .001, 
ηp
2 = .11 and Types of Detail Pre-Informed, F(5, 185) = 2.53, p = .030, 
ηp
2 = .06. The univariate main effects for Veracity are presented in 
Table 1. Truth tellers provided more new details and more new 
complications (both low and medium/high) than liars, whereas liars 
provided more new common knowledge details and more new self-
handicapping strategies than truth tellers. The effect sizes (d) ranged 
from somewhat small (d = 0.37) to medium (d = 0.53). 
Regarding the Types of Detail Pre-Informed main effect, one 
significant univariate effect occurred, F(1, 189) = 8.88, p = .003, d = 
0.45 (0.16, 0.73), with participants in the Types of Detail Pre-Informed 
Present condition reporting fewer common knowledge details (M = 
0.43, SD = 0.79, 95% CI [0.24, 0.64]) than those in the Absent condition 
(M = 0.90, SD = 1.24, 95% CI [0.67, 1.08]). All other effects were not 
significant, all Fs < 1.37, all ps > .238.
An ANCOVA utilizing a 2 (Veracity) x 2 (Model Statement Pre-
Informed) x 2 (Types of Detail Pre-Informed) between-subjects 
design was carried out with proportion of complications (based on 
the new information provided after listening to the Model Statement) 
as the dependent variable. Again, we calculated the proportion score 
based on the total number of complications (summation of low 
and medium/high). Preparation thoroughness, preparation time, 
motivation, and site were covariates. The analysis revealed a main 
effect for Veracity, F(1, 189) = 12.61, p < .001, d = 0.47 (0.18, 0.74) 
with truth tellers (M = 0.80, SD = 0.32, 95% CI [0.74, 0.88]) obtaining 
a higher proportion of complication score than liars (M = 0.64, SD = 
0.36, 95% CI [0.57, 0.70]). The effect size (d) was medium. 
The two other main effects and all interaction effects were not 
significant, all Fs < 2.47, all ps > .117. Again, the absence of any in-
teraction effect involving the Veracity factor means that the Hypo-
thesis was rejected.
Total interview: uninformed truth tellers – informed liars 
comparisons. A MANCOVA was carried out with Veracity as the only 
factor. The Veracity factor had four levels: (i) uninformed truth tellers, 
(ii) liars informed about the Model Statement, (iii) liars informed about 
the types of detail, and (iv) liars informed about the Model Statement 
and the types of detail. The dependent were the total unique: details, 
complications low, complications medium/high, common knowledge 
details, self-handicapping strategies, as well as the proportion of 
complications based on the total number of unique complications 
(low and medium/high combined), common knowledge details and 
self-handicapping strategies. Preparation thoroughness, preparation 
time, motivation, and site were covariates. The analysis revealed a 
non-significant multivariate effect for Veracity, F(18, 266) = 1.06, p = 
.339, ηp
2 = .07. The Hypothesis was therefore rejected.
New information after the model statement: Uninformed 
truth tellers – informed liars comparisons. Another MANCOVA was 
carried out with the four level Veracity factor as the only factor, but 
with dependent variables, the new total details, new complications 
low, new complications medium/high, new common knowledge 
details, new self-handicapping strategies, and new proportion of 
Table 1. Statistical Results as a Function of Veracity
Truth Lie
F p
Cohen’s d
M (SD) 95% CI M (SD) 95% CI d 95% CI
Total interview
Number of details (total details) 102.11 (63.06)   94.39, 118.39 83.64 (50.22) 68.04, 91.13 9.04 .003 0.32 0.04, 0.60
Number of complications low   6.87 (7.23) 5.82, 8.39 4.81 (4.91) 3.36, 5.82 6.98 .009 0.33 0.05, 0.61
Number of complications medium or high   1.74 (2.78) 1.35, 2.25 0.60 (1.18) 0.11, 0.97 14.22 < .001 0.63 0.33, 0.90
Number of common knowledge details   2.61 (2.28) 2.13, 3.14 3.28 (2.49) 2.78, 3.75 2.82 .095 0.28 0.00, 0.55
Number of self-handicapping strategies   0.13 (0.49) 0.03, 0.28 0.32 (0.64) 0.18, 0.42 2.57 .111 0.33 0.05, 0.61
Proportion of complications   0.60 (0.35) 0.54, 0.68 0.51 (0.33) 0.44, 0.57 4.37 .038 0.26 -0.02, 0.54
After Model Statement
Number of new details (total new details)   50.34 (43.96) 45.22, 60.42 35.28 (27.43) 25.61, 40.24 12.41 .001 0.41 0.12, 0.68
Number of new complications low   4.80 (5.20) 4.12, 5.93 2.99 (3.47) 1.92, 3.66 11.04 .001 0.41 0.12, 0.68
Number of new complications medium or high   1.51 (2.55) 1.18, 2.00 0.48 (1.06) 0.01, 0.79 15.35 < .001 0.53 0.24, 0.80
Number of new common knowledge details   0.41 (0.86) 0.21, 0.65 0.89 (1.18) 0.67, 1.09 7.93 .005 0.46 0.18, 0.74
Number of new self-handicapping strategies   0.02 (0.14)   -0.04, 0.10 0.13 (0.40) 0.06, 0.19 4.01 .047 0.37 0.08, 0.64
Proportion of complications   0.80 (0.32) 0.74, 0.88 0.64 (0.36) 0.57, 0.70 12.61 < .001 0.47 0.18, 0.74
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complications (based on the total number of new complications 
(low and medium/high combined), common knowledge detail, and 
self-handicapping strategies. Preparation thoroughness, preparation 
time, motivation, and site were covariates.
The analysis revealed a significant multivariate effect for Veracity, 
F(18, 266) = 1.69, p = .041, ηp
2 = .10. At a univariate level four significant 
effects of Veracity emerged. For new details F(3, 95) = 3.73, p = .014, 
ηp
2 = .11, new complications low, F(3, 95) = 2.99, p = .035, ηp
2 = .09, new 
complications medium/high, F(3, 95) = 5.19, p = .002, ηp
2 = .14, and pro-
portion of complications, F(3, 95) = 2.73, p = .048, ηp
2 = .08. The effects 
of Veracity for common knowledge details and self-handicapping stra-
tegies were not significant, both Fs < 2.46, both ps > 0.067. Of particu-
lar interest are the comparisons between the uninformed truth tellers 
with the three groups of liars. The results are presented in Table 2. As 
a baseline comparison, we also included the uninformed truth tellers 
– uninformed liars comparisons; these comparisons are presented at 
the top of Table 2. For the uninformed truth tellers – uninformed liars 
comparisons – all four effects were significant. The effect sizes ranged 
from small (d = 0.34) to medium (d = 0.63). Similar patterns of findings 
emerged in the three remaining analyses. That is, most effects were sig-
nificant and d-scores generally ranged from small to medium. In other 
words, these analyses also showed no effect for the hypothesis.
Discussion
In the present experiment, we found no evidence that liars 
sounded like truth tellers after being informed about the Model 
Statement and/or Types of Detail we examined. This lack of evidence 
cannot correspond to a lack of power as study power was good. The 
lack of evidence already became apparent in the absence of any 
interaction effects involving the Veracity factor in the analyses of 
variance utilising full factorial designs. It became further apparent in 
the specific comparisons we made between uninformed truth tellers 
and informed liars. The absence of a countermeasures effect was not 
expected as we predicted that liars would be able to sound like truth 
tellers when they were informed about both the Model Statement 
and the Types of Detail we examined.
The self-reports in the post-interview questionnaire provides 
some insight into what happened. First, participants indicated to 
have read and understood the working of the Model Statement. 
However, the results also revealed that after listening to the Model 
Statement all participants, including those in the Model Statement 
Information absence condition, understood the aim of the Model 
Statement (encouraging then to report more information). In 
other words, reading about the Model Statement did not help the 
participants because the aim of the Model Statement was clear to 
all participants. Although we informed participants in the Model 
Statement Pre-Informed condition what a Model Statement is and 
what it is meant to do, we did not inform them how we use the 
Model Statement in a within-subjects design (i.e., initial free recall 
followed by exposure to a Model Statement followed by a second free 
recall, and paying attention to the new details in the second recall). 
Perhaps liars in the experiment expected a Model Statement at the 
beginning of the interview and became confused when this did not 
happen. Perhaps providing liars with this specific within-subjects 
information will help them to effectively use countermeasures, 
an issue worth examining in future research. If the efficacy of 
countermeasures depends on providing information about how the 
Model Statement is used in an interview, practitioners can exploit 
this because they can introduce the Model Statement in different 
ways.
The self-report results for the Types of Detail Pre-Informed 
condition showed that participants in the Types of Detail Pre-Informed 
present condition moderately read and understood the provided 
information. The Types of Detail information sheet contained fewer 
words (N = 749) than the Model Statement information sheet (N = 
1,064); thus the length of the information sheet cannot explain why 
it was read less carefully than the Model Statement information 
sheet. We think that participants found the text about types of 
detail difficult to understand. Participants in the Types of Detail Pre-
Informed Present condition were more accurate than the participants 
in the Absent condition about the relationship between the types of 
detail and deception. However, this only applied to complications and 
even for this variable many participants gave the incorrect answer 
regarding its relationship with deception.
Table 2. Statistical Results as a Function of Veracity: Comparisons between Uninformed Truth Tellers and Different Categories of Liars
Truth Lie
F p
Cohen’s d
M (SD) 95% CI M (SD) 95% CI d 95% CI
Uninformed truth tellers – uninformed liars 
Number of new details (total new details) 51.71 (57.91) 42.41, 80.65 36.27 (28.53) 8.94, 45.46 5.93 .019 0.34 -0.22, 0.90
Number of new complications low 4.96 (5.54) 3.74, 7.42 2.42 (2.76) 0.09, 3.61 7.57 .009 0.59  0.01, 1.14
Number of new complications medium or high 1.75 (3.05) 1.17, 3.10 0.38 (0.75) -0.89, 0.95 8.72 .005 0.63 0.05, 1.19
Proportion of complications 0.76 (0.34) 0.64, 0.95 0.59 (0.37) 0.41, 0.71 4.37 .042 0.48 -0.09, 1.03
Uninformed truth tellers – liars informed about  
Model Statement comparison
Number of new details (total new details) 51.71 (57.91) 42.78, 82.03 35.08 (22.42) 6.54, 43.86 6.06 .018 0.38 -0.18, 0.94
Number of new complications low 4.96 (5.54) 3.38, 7.06 2.46 (2.28) 0.47, 3.97 4.48 .040 0.60 0.02, 1.16
Number of new complications medium or high 1.75 (3.05) 1.26, 3.27 0.15 (0.37) -1.27, 0.63 11.28 .002 0.75 0.17, 1.31
Proportion of complications 0.76 (0.34) 0.62, 0.93 0.56 (0.37) 0.40, 0.70 3.55 .066 0.56 -0.01, 1.12
Uninformed truth tellers – liars informed about  
Types of Detail comparison
Number of new details (total new details) 51.71 (57.91) 48.87, 86.30 33.25 (24.48) 2.67, 36.62 11.57 .001 0.43 -0.13, 0.97
Number of new complications low 4.96 (5.54) 4.19, 8.39 3.61 (4.12) 0.56, 4.37 5.86 .019 0.28 -0.27, 0.82
Number of new complications medium or high 1.75 (3.05) 1.30, 3.47 0.71 (1.38) -0.81, 1.16 7.33 .009 0.45 -0.11, 1.00
Proportion of complications 0.76 (0.34) 0.67, 0.98 0.67 (0.35) 0.48, 0.76 3.22 .080 0.26 -0.29, 0.80
Uninformed truth tellers – liars informed about  
Model Statement and Types of Detail comparison
Number of new details (total new details) 51.71 (57.91) 41.86, 80.55 35.96 (34.52) 7.93, 45.75 5.88 .020 0.33 -0.24, 0.89
Number of new complications low 4.96 (5.54) 3.81, 7.84 3.32 (4.30) 0.52, 4.46 5.09 .029 0.33 -0.24, 0.89
Number of new complications medium or high 1.75 (3.05) 1.21, 3.17 0.64 (1.32) -0.74, 1.18 7.50 .009 0.48 -0.10, 1.04
Proportion of complications 0.76 (0.34) 0.67, 0.96 0.73 (0.35) 0.54, 0.82 1.75 .193 0.09 -0.47, 0.65
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Some reasons can be given for why participants may have found 
the types of detail information sheet difficult to understand. First, it 
could have been a translation issue and perhaps the translated texts 
are difficult to understand. To avoid this issue, we used translators 
who were familiar with the deception literature, but inaccuracies 
may still have emerged in the translated texts. Second, only a few 
examples of complications, common knowledge details, and self-
handicapping strategies were provided in the information sheet 
and this reflected the information given in the articles on which the 
information sheet was based. Perhaps the use of countermeasures 
becomes more effective when more examples are given. In a 
similar vein, the Types of Detail information sheet only mentioned 
what differences in detail between truth tellers and liars typically 
emerge and did not mention what liars should say or avoid saying 
to sound convincing. Perhaps the use of countermeasures becomes 
more effective when it is explicitly mentioned in information sheets 
what liars should say and should avoid saying. However, providing 
additional information, such as more examples and instructions what 
to say or avoid saying, goes beyond the scope of our countermeasures 
research. We examined whether liars who are informed about the 
Model Statement and types of detail through reading articles can 
successfully employ countermeasures.
Regarding the Veracity effects, stronger results appeared when 
examining the new details after the Model Statement than when 
examining the total of unique details reported in the entire interview. 
In other words, examining details in the manner recently suggested 
appeared to be most effective (see Vrij, Leal, & Fisher, 2018; Vrij, Leal, 
Jupe et al., 2018). Truth tellers provided more new details and more 
new complications (both low and medium/high) than liars, whereas 
liars provided more new common knowledge details and more new 
self-handicapping strategies than truth tellers. That truth tellers report 
more new details and new complications is compatible with the idea 
that giving truth tellers an additional opportunity to recall invariably 
leads to new information (reminiscence: e.g., Gilbert & Fisher, 2006), 
which is the essence of the “multiple retrieval” principle of the Cognitive 
Interview (Fisher & Geisleman, 1992). That liars do not report as many 
new details and complications is compatible with liars’ lack of episodic 
memory about the event and also with their strategy to “keep it simple” 
and not to reveal unnecessary details (Hartwig et al., 2007). That liars do 
provide additional common knowledge details and self-handicapping 
strategies is compatible with the belief that liars feel compelled to 
say something after being exposed to a Model Statement –but not to 
provide the kind of details that might implicate that they are lying.
Complications and the proportion of complications yielded 
stronger results than common knowledge details and self-
handicapping strategies, which replicated the previous findings when 
these three variables were observed (Leal, Vrij, Deeb, & Kamermans, 
2019; Vrij, Leal et al., 2017; Vrij, Leal, Fisher, Mann et al., 2018; Vrij, 
Leal, Jupe et al., 2018; Vrij et al., 2019). Unlike previous research, 
the proportion of complications did not yield a stronger effect than 
the total details variable (Leal et al., 2019; Vrij, Leal et al., 2017; Vrij, 
Leal, Fisher, Mann et al., 2018; Vrij, Leal, Jupe et al., 2018; Vrij et al., 
2019). Our data cannot explain this finding, but we speculate that this 
may have been caused by the Types of Detail information provision. 
That is, information resulted in both participants –truth tellers and 
liars alike – providing fewer common knowledge details. The fewer 
common knowledge details are reported, the higher the proportion 
of complications score will become.
In the present experiment, we recruited participants in Lebanon, 
Mexico, and South-Korea. In that respect the study deviated from 
the typical deception research conducted in the United States and 
Western Europe and widens our knowledge about cues to deception. 
A next step would be to compare the results between the three 
different countries. We could not do this with the present data set. 
First, this would result in a 24 cells between-subjects design for 
which we lacked the statistical power. Second, since we used native 
interviewers in each country, nationality was confounded with the 
specific interviewer.
In conclusion, we found no evidence that liars sounded like 
truth tellers after being informed about the Model Statement 
and/or Types of Detail we examined. This does not rule out that 
countermeasures may become more effective if specific information 
about the use of the Model Statement is given or if participants are 
explicitly instructed which types of detail they should report and 
which ones they should avoid reporting.
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Note
1Some changes were made compared to the pre-registration. 
First, we did not introduce the expected-unexpected questions 
distinction in the interviews as that would have made the interviews 
too long. Second, we split the countermeasure variables in two 
variables and thus ran a 2 x 2 x 2 design rather than a 2 x 4 design. 
Third, we did not code for core and peripheral details as the deception 
scenario we used is not suitable for this distinction (most, if not 
all, information would be considered core information). Fourth, in 
the pre-registration we refer to ‘complications’ and ‘plausibility of 
complications’. When discussing the coding scheme, we changed 
this into complications-low and complications-medium/high as we 
thought this to be less subjective than ‘plausibility’ (we discussed 
this possibility in the pre-registration). We discuss the plausibility 
variable and results in the Appendix of this article.
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Appendix
Supplementary Materials
The Model Statement Information Sheet
Specific interview techniques have been developed that make lie 
detection easier because truth tellers and liars respond differently 
when exposed to these techniques. To what extent can a liar who 
learns about the techniques successfully adjust her/his responses 
so that s/he sounds like a truth teller? In this document you will 
find information about one such technique, the model statement 
technique. Please read this information carefully because in the 
interview you will be exposed to the model statement technique. This 
document consists of three parts: The first part Interviewing to detect 
deception contains some general information about lie detection 
techniques that successfully discriminate truth tellers from liars. The 
second part Encouraging interviewees to provide more information 
gives a little bit more information about the general approach we 
will use in the interview you will have after reading this document. 
The third part A model answer (model statement) outlines the 
specific approach we will use in the interview: the model statement 
technique. It contains:
- The rationale. 
- How it was used in an interview in which the model statement 
was tested.
- The results of an experiment in which it was used.
You can take as long as you wish to read this document and to 
think how to apply your knowledge about it in the interview. Good 
luck!
Interviewing to Detect Deception 
(from Vrij, Fisher, & Blank, 2017)
The core of the cognitive lie detection approach is that 
investigators can magnify the differences in (non-)verbal 
cues displayed by truth tellers and liars. If successful, those 
interventions should facilitate lie detection. The cognitive 
lie detection approach consists of three techniques that can 
differentiate truth tellers from liars: (1) imposing cognitive load, 
(2) encouraging interviewees to provide more information, and 
(3) asking unexpected questions. 
Encouraging Interviewees to Provide More Information 
The core of the encouraging interviewees to provide more 
information technique is as follows. If truth tellers provide more 
information, they are more likely to be believed, because the 
richer an account is perceived to be in detail, the more likely it is 
to be believed. Moreover, the additional information truth tellers 
provide could provide leads to investigators to check. Liars may 
find it cognitively too difficult to add as many details as truth tellers 
do, or, if liars do add a sufficient amount of detail, the additional 
information may be of lesser quality or may sound less plausible. 
Also, liars may be reluctant to add more information out of fear that 
it will provide leads to investigators and, consequently, give their 
lies away. In other words, techniques that facilitate interviewees 
to say more may result in truth tellers in particular saying more. 
Research has supported this premise. Experimental research to 
date has revealed four ways to facilitate truth tellers to say more: 
(i) by using a supportive interviewer (nodding head and smiling 
during an interview, (ii) by giving an example of a model answer (a 
very detailed answer), (iii) by using drawings, and (iv) by using the 
cognitive interview technique.
A model Answer (Model Statement) (from Leal et al., 2015)
The Rationale
Differences between truth tellers and liars may emerge if truth 
tellers provide longer statements. Talkative truth tellers raise the 
standard for liars, who also need to become more talkative to match 
truth tellers. In becoming more talkative, liars potentially increase 
exposing their deception. A possible way to make truth tellers more 
talkative is to provide participants with a detailed, model statement 
– albeit about an unrelated topic. The underlying assumption is 
that if truth tellers hear a detailed model statement, their views on 
what is expected from them may change and, as a result, they may 
provide a more detailed answer themselves. Truth tellers’ inclination 
to provide more detail after being exposed to a detailed model 
statement may not be replicated by liars. First, liars face the problem 
that they should not say too much, as the information they give may 
indicate that they are lying. For example, they may say something that 
the interviewer knows to be false or easily can find out to be false. 
Second, liars typically prepare themselves for interviews. However, 
it is unlikely that they have prepared as much detail as the detailed 
model statement implies they should provide. A model statement 
therefore puts pressure on liars to include more detail than they have 
initially prepared. Perhaps liars lack the imagination and skills to 
generate the same amount of extra detail as truth tellers do. If so, then 
truth tellers will give longer answers that contain more detail than 
liars, particularly after being exposed to a detailed model statement. 
An alternative outcome is possible. After listening to a detailed, model 
statement liars may manage to lengthen their answers and provide 
additional detail. However, this additional information may not sound 
as plausible as the additional information truth tellers provide. If this 
is the case, then number of words and amount of detail will not differ 
between truth tellers and liars, but plausibility would, with truth 
tellers’ answers sounding more plausible, particularly after being 
exposed to a detailed model statement. 
How to Apply a Model Statement in an Interview
In the interview, prior to answering the open-ended question 
to discuss their experiences in detail, participants were asked to 
listen to an audiotape in which a person gives a detailed account of 
attending a motor racing event. We did not want to give participants 
an idea what to say during the interview (hence, the unrelated event 
of motor racing), but wanted to give them an idea about what a 
detailed account entails. The model statement audiotape was a recall 
of a witness describing his experiences when attending motor racing 
for 1 day. This was a spontaneous, unscripted, recall of the event, and 
the only instruction the witness received was to be as detailed as 
possible. The witness was aware that this recall would be used as an 
example for others. We did not give any guidance about what types 
of detail to include and about what to say. 
The Results
Being exposed to a model statement resulted in truth tellers 
and liars adding a similar number of words to their stories which 
contained similar detail. However, these additional details sounded 
more plausible in truth tellers. Apparently, adding words and details 
to a story is one thing; doing that in a plausible way is another issue. 
The Types of Detail Information Sheet
Research has shown that truth tellers and liars often differ in 
speech content when recalling a story. In this document we briefly 
describe the main differences. 
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“You can take as long as you wish to read this document and to think 
how to apply your knowledge about it in the interview. Good luck!”.
Speech Content and Deception (from Vrij, Leal, Jupe, & Harvey, 
2018)
Total amount of information. Truth tellers typically provide more 
details than liars, because (i) liars lack the imagination to fabricate 
details that sound plausible or (ii) they are unwilling to provide many 
details out of fear that those details give leads to investigators that 
they are lying.
Complications, common knowledge details and self-
handicapping strategies. Total amount of information is a generic 
measure that does not take into account the different types of detail 
truth tellers and liars report. In brief, truth tellers provide stories 
that include non-essential details that make the story more complex 
(complications). By comparison, liars provide details that are based 
on common knowledge, or justify why they cannot provide certain 
types of information (self-handicapping strategies). 
A complication is “an occurrence that makes a situation more 
difficult than necessary” (“The air conditioning was not working 
properly in the hotel”). Complications are more likely to occur 
in truthful statements than in deceptive statements. Making up 
complications requires imagination, but liars may not have adequate 
imagination to do so. In addition, research examining liars’ interview 
strategies showed that liars prefer to keep their stories simple, but 
adding complications makes the story more complex. More examples 
of complications are: i) …”she was meant to get a sirloin and I was 
meant to get a rump but she wanted hers medium rare and they did it 
the wrong way round and when we tried to complain they didn’t like 
it” ii)… “when we got on to the M23 there was a lot of traffic there, 
I’m not sure what was causing the hold-up but yeah took a bit longer 
than expected to get there”, and iii)… “I remember my en-suite the 
toilet wouldn’t flush properly, so we had to call maintenance for them 
to try to sort it out”. 
Common knowledge details refer to strongly invoked stereotypical 
information about events (“We visited the Louvre museum where 
was saw the Mona Lisa”). Liars are more likely to include common 
knowledge details in their statements than truth tellers. Truth tellers 
have personal experiences of an event and are likely to report such 
unique experiences. When they do so the statement is no longer 
scripted. If liars do not have personal experiences of the event they 
report, they then will draw upon general knowledge to construe the 
event (Sporer, 2016). In case liars do have personal experiences of 
the event, they may not report them due to their desire to keep their 
stories simple. More examples of common knowledge details are: 
i)… “we visited the haunted house and we went to London Eye” ii)… 
“we just went sightseeing to Bath Abbey and then just looked around 
there” and iii)… “yeah it was wonderful sightseeing. We went to the 
Colosseum”.
Self-handicapping strategies refer to explicit or implicit 
justifications as to why someone is not able to provide information 
(“I can’t remember; it was a while ago when this happened”; 
“Nothing unexpected happened; I am a very organised person”; 
“I fell asleep in the bus”). Liars are more likely to include self-
handicapping strategies in their statements than truth tellers. 
For liars, who are inclined to keep stories simple, not having to 
provide information is an attractive strategy. However, liars are also 
concerned about their credibility and believe that admitting lack of 
knowledge and/or memory appears suspicious. A potential solution 
is to provide a justification for the inability to provide information. 
Note that the justification does not have to be made explicit. The 
example “I fell asleep in the bus” is an implicit justification for 
not being able to provide information. More examples of self-
handicapping strategies are: i) “I’m not sure exactly what shops we 
went in because it was quite a while ago”, ii) “And then we just 
all sort of fell asleep in the car on the way back home”, and iii) 
“We got there around the afternoon-ish and we looked around. 
And we went home after that because we were really tired because 
it’s quite tiring looking around and stuff”. (Examples 1 and 3 are 
explicit justifications and example 2 is an implicit justification.)
Plausibility
Coding 
One coder, blind to the veracity and countermeasures conditions, 
coded plausibility on 7-point Likert scales ranging from (1) not 
plausible to (7) very plausible after each of the four questions, taking 
into account the plausibility of the previous answers (thus, in fact, 
measuring plausibility of the story as it develops). The story of a 
Korean participant who said he travelled from Seoul to Barcelona 
just for the weekend was considered not plausible because someone 
typically does not travel from Seoul to Barcelona just for the weekend. 
In addition, the story of the participant who said he visited Windsor 
Castle, Buckingham Palace, and Tate Modern in one day was also 
considered implausible because that is a lot to visit in one day. A 
second coder coded a random sample of 40 transcripts. Inter-rater 
reliability between the two coders, using the two-way random effects 
model measuring consistency, was good, ICC = .75). 
For the Total Interview analysis we used the plausibility score 
after the final question. For the After Model Statement analysis we 
averaged the plausibility scores of the two questions before the 
Model Statement and also for the two questions after the Model 
Statement. We then detracted the before the Model Statement 
score from the after the Model Statement score, a score that could 
range from -6 to +6. A positive score means that a statement became 
more plausible after the Model Statement, a negative score means 
that a statement became less plausible after the Model Statement. 
We label this the ‘plausibility change’ score
Total Interview Analysis
An ANCOVA utilizing a 2 (Veracity) x 2 (Model Statement Pre-
Informed) x 2 (Types of Detail Pre-Informed) between-subjects 
design was carried out with plausibility after the final question as 
dependent variable. Preparation thoroughness, preparation time, 
motivation and site were covariates. The analysis revealed a main 
effect for Veracity, F(1, 189) = 32.74, p < .001, d = 0.80 (0.50, 1.08). 
All other effects were not significant, all Fs < 1.97, all ps > .162. 
Truth tellers’ stories (M = 4.71, SD = 1.45, 95% CI [4.49, 5.07]) were 
considered more plausible than liars’ stories (M = 3.62, SD = 1.26, 
95% CI [3.28, 3.83]). 
After the Model Statement Analysis
A second ANCOVA utilizing a 2 (Veracity) x 2 (Model Statement 
Pre-Informed) x 2 (Types of Detail Pre-Informed) between-subjects 
design was carried out with the plausibility change score as the 
dependent variable. Preparation thoroughness, preparation time, 
motivation and site were covariates. The analysis revealed a main 
effect for Veracity, F(1, 189) = 24.01, p < .001, d = 0.66 (0.37, 0.94). 
All other effects were not significant, all Fs < 3.11, all ps > .079. Truth 
tellers’ stories (M = 0.67, SD = 0.88, 95% CI [0.53,0.88]) gained more 
in plausibility after the Model Statement than liars’ stories (M = 
0.10, SD = 0.84, 95% CI [-0.11, 0.23]). One sample t-tests comparing 
the scores with 0 (no change) showed that truth tellers’ stories 
became more plausible after the Model Statement, t(96) = 7.47, p < 
.001, whereas the plausibility of liars’ stories did not change, t(103) 
= 1.17, p = .244.
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Uninformed Truth Tellers – Informed Liars Comparisons
The uninformed truth tellers – different types of liar comparisons 
are presented in Table 3. As a baseline comparison, we used the 
uninformed truth tellers – uninformed liars comparisons; these 
comparisons are presented at the top of Table 3. For the uninformed 
truth tellers – uninformed liars comparisons, both effects were 
significant, with effect sizes d = 0.63 for plausibility at the final 
question and d = 0.79 for plausibility change respectively. The effect 
sizes for plausibility after the final question were similar in the 
three remaining analyses. A somewhat different pattern emerged 
for the plausibility change variable, because the effect sizes became 
smaller if participants were informed about the types of detail. 
This demonstrates a small countermeasures effect, although it is 
important to note that even in these conditions liars’ stories were still 
considered less plausible than the truth tellers’ stories.
Table 3. Statistical Results as a Function of Veracity: Comparisons between Uninformed Truth Tellers and Different Categories of Liars
Truth Lie
F p
Cohen’s d
M (SD) 95% CI M (SD) 95% CI d 95% CI
Uninformed truth tellers – uninformed liars 
Plausibility after the final question 4.38 (1.74) 3.98, 5.26 3.46 (1.17) 2.76, 3.91 6.92 .012 0.63 0.05, 1.18
Plausibility change 0.56 (1.06) 0.29, 1.06 -0.15 (0.73) -0.55, 0.18 7.75 .008 0.79 0.20, 1.35
Uninformed truth tellers – liars informed about  
Model Statement comparison
Plausibility after the final question 4.38 (1.74) 3.98, 5.26 3.58 (1.24) 2.75, 3.96 6.62 .014 0.53 -0.04, 1.09
Plausibility change 0.56 (1.06) 0.29, 1.06 0.00 (0.72) -0.47, 0.27 6.81 .012 0.62 0.05, 1.18
Uninformed truth tellers – liars informed about  
Types of Detail comparison
Plausibility after the final question 4.38 (1.74) 3.98, 5.26 3.64 (1.70) 2.60, 3.94 7.68 .008 0.43 -0.13, 0.98
Plausibility change 0.56 (1.06) 0.29, 1.06 0.21 (0.91) -0.39, 0.37 6.89 .012 0.36 -0.20, 0.90
Uninformed truth tellers – liars informed about  
Model Statement and Types of Detail comparison
Plausibility after the final question 4.38 (1.74) 3.98, 5.26 3.76 (1.33) 2.88, 4.10 6.55 .014 0.40 -0.17, 0.96
Plausibility change 0.56 (1.06) 0.29, 1.06 0.30 (0.92) -0.25, 0.58 3.06 .087 0.26 -0.30, 0.82
